In retaliation, the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesia militias engulfed East Timor in violence which UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has described as 'shocking'. Hundreds are believed to have been killed. Some 75% of the population has been displaced either into the mountainous interior, where they have faced starvation, or to other parts of Indonesia and West Timor in particular where over 200,000 have been held in squalid refugee camps, many of them forcibly. There has also been widespread looting and destruction of property. At least 50% of homes in Dili and the western part of East Timor have been damaged or destroyed. Civil society has been destroyed and government no longer functions. UNAMET was obliged to deploy to Darwin and most UNAMET facilities were heavily damaged or destroyed. The ICRC and other humanitarian agencies suffered a similar fate.
On September 15, the UN Security Council authorised a multi-national peace enforcement mission in East Timor (Interfet) to restore peace and security and to facilitate humanitarian relief efforts. 7000 troops led by Australia have now secured most of East Timor with the exception of the Oecusse enclave and parts of the border region were militias remain active, operating from bases in West Timor supported by elements of the Indonesian army. A major international relief effort is underway and internally displaced people are slowly returning to their communities.
Some 400,000 thousand are still missing, presumed to be hiding in the interior, and despite agreements between the UNHCR and the Indonesian Government on the right of return, there are serious concerns about the security of refugees in militia controlled camps in West Timor and their freedom to go home.
The bulk of Indonesia's forces have left East Timor. On October 20 the Indonesian Parliament resolved to formally ratify East Timor's separation from Indonesia allowing the UN Security Council to approve the establishment of a UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET 's principal role will be to facilitate the transition of East Timor to independence. This is expected to take 2-3 years and will include the deployment of a 10,000 strong UN peacekeeping operation and UNTAET's overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor including the exercise of all legislative and executive authority, the administration of justice and the organising of elections.
The East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, returned to East Timor on 22 October and will play a central role in the transition to independence.
An international inquiry established by the UN Commission on Human Rights has begun compiling information on possible violations of human rights and breaches of international humanitarian law in East Timor since January 1999 and will complete its report to Kofi Annan by 31 December.
Even before its current ravaging, East Timor was one of the poorest parts of Asia with 90% of its population living in rural areas dependent on basic agriculture and an economy heavily dependent on fiscal transfers from Jakarta. Indonesia's devastation of the territory and withdrawal of resources have left a legacy of bitterness, trauma and acute impoverishment which will take generations to overcome and will require the sustained assistance and goodwill of the international community over many years.
KEY ISSUES FOR INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION
1. UN FUNDING. It is critical that the international community gives strong and sustained political support to the UN as it facilitates the next stage of East Timor's transition to independence. Governments must also contribute generously and urgently to the UN Trust Fund established to cover, inter alia, the cost of the rehabilitation of essential physical and human infrastructure in East Timor, and the costs of UNTAET and peacekeeping. Lack of support at this critical juncture will undermine both East Timor's already difficult prospects of recovery and threaten regional stability.
2. REFUGEES. International pressure is required to enable all the 300,000 East Timorese currently displaced in West Timor and other parts of Indonesia to return home if that is their wish. In West Timor, Indonesia must be pressed to disarm the militias who are controlling many of the refugee camps, restricting access by humanitarian agencies and blocking road access to East Timor across the border.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS INQUIRY. The wave of terror unleashed in East Timor was state-sponsored. UN member states should give full support to the establishment of the international commission of inquiry into human rights violations in East Timor, including the provision of intelligence, and should support the establishment of an ad hoc Tribunal for East Timor by the UN Security Council. These initiatives will contribute significantly to the ending of the culture of military impunity in Indonesia.
4. CNRT. Though international assistance of all forms is essential, East Timor's development should be determined by the wishes of the East Timorese people, not external donors and policy makers, particularly as expressed through East Timorese NGOs and the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT), headed by Xanana Gusmao.
5. CAPACITY AND PEACE BUILDING. The focus on rebuilding devastated physical infrastructure should not detract from the fundamental need to build human and institutional capacity. Institutional and human capacity in East Timor has always been weak due to the years of conflict and has been depleted by the recent violence. Particularly attention must be given to the building of robust NGOs within a strong civil society and peace and reconciliation activities to heal the deep traumas and divisions of the last 25 years.
6. AID COORDINATION. A coordinated approach is necessary to help the East Timorese to rebuild and develop their devastated homeland. Aid efficiency and sustainable development will be impeded if donors- NGOs, governments, private sector and multilateral bodies - act independently. Coordination must also be inclusive of East Timorese organisations at all stages.
7. INDONESIA. International concern for East Timor must not be permitted to deflect support, aid or resources from Indonesia as it makes its own transition to democracy in difficult political and economic circumstances. Democratic control of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) is indeed essential to the long-term stability of East Timor.
Source: Australian Council for Overseas Aid. Email: acfoahr@acfoa.asn.au